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PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY UNDER SECTION 301
OF THE LMRA*
INTERSCIENCE Publishers, party to a collective agreement covering forty
employee members of District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store
Union, announced in June, 1961, its intention to merge the following October
with John Wiley & Sons, a substantially larger publishing company which
was not unionized.1 It also announced that Wiley, the surviving company,
would refuse to recognize the union although it was willing to hire all em-
ployees of Interscience, who would then represent a minority of the workers
of the new enterprise. Inasmuch as the agreement between Interscience and
the Union did not contain a clause binding the company's successors, Wiley
felt secure in terminating it. Dissatisfied with a termination of the collective
agreement during its life,2 and with the prospect of losing already organized
employees, District 65 protested before and after the merger both to Inter-
science and to Wiley. When this proved unsuccessful, the Union brought suit
against Wiley under the collective agreement, as provided in section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act,3 in order to compel arbitration of the
dispute.4
The Union's protests, although strenuous, were not made in compliance
with the grievance procedures established by the collective agreement. The
contract required the affected employee or employees to "raise the grievance
directly with the Company... not later than four weeks after its occurrence
or latest existence." 5 No employee ever raised a grievance. The contract fur-
ther required "that if the difference must be arbitrated, the parties make an
effort to name a mutually acceptable arbitrator." 6 No such effort was made.
"Failure to file the grievance [in writing] within the 'time limitation' of four
weeks is 'to be construed and be deemed to be an abandonment of the griev-
ance.'" Faced with this language, the district court found it "undisputed"
that the time limits were not met, and that ". . . the procedures set up by the
contract for the resolution of those ...grievances were completely ignored.
* . ." The court never had to reach the underlying question of whether the
*John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
1. The statement of facts is based on Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-15, John. Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Brief).
2. The union was concerned with the loss of seniority of the merged employees, as
well as the loss of vacation pay and employer contributions to District 65 Security Plan
and District 65 Security Plan, Pension Fund. Brief 11-12.
3. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
4. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
5. Brief at 57.
6. Ibid.
7. Id. at 58.
8. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 171, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
9. Ibid.
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dislocations caused by the merger constituted an arbitrable dispute under the
contract; it simply held that, as the Union had not complied with the proce-
dural conditions precedent to arbitration established by the contract, the suit
must fail.
The Union appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
reversed the district court, holding, inter alia, that it was for the arbitrator,
not the court, to decide whether or not a union had complied with the griev-
ance procedures.' 0 The Supreme Court, on certiorari, affirmed." Mr. Justice
Harlan, for a unanimous Court, in this the first Supreme Court case pre-
senting the issue of procedural arbitrability - the question of whether a court
or an arbitrator should decide all issues of compliance with the grievance pro-
cedure 12 - held that a court's role under section 301 is exhausted once it
has found the substantive dispute to be arbitrable. The issue of procedural
arbitrability was thus resolved by the Court in favor of the arbitrator.13
The proper meaning of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the proper
role of the federal courts in applying it, have been problems of great signifi-
cance to the labor bar for several years.14 Section 301 itself simply provides
that the federal courts shall have jurisdiction of suits between employers and
labor unions without regard to diversity of citizenship. It contains no stand-
ards to guide the courts in deciding these suits. In 1957, the Supreme Court
first gave content to section 301 by holding that a union may sue in federal
court to compel an employer to arbitrate a dispute covered by the arbitration
clause of the collective agreement.15 The standards to be employed in deciding
10. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963). Reaching the
merger question, the Second Circuit held that because an arbitrator could find the agree-
ment survived consolidation, he should be given, the opportunity to do so.
11. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
12. For an introduction to procedural arbitrability see Note, Procedural Requirenments
of a Grievance Arbitration Clause: Another Question of Arbitrability, 70 YALE L.J. 611
(1961) ; Dunau, Procedural Arbitrability - A Question for Court or Arbitrator, 14 LAB.
L.J. 1010 (1963) ; Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAzv. L. Rnv. 1482, 1508-
11 (1959).
13. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit on the merger question also,
holding that ".. . Wiley's obligation to arbitrate this dispute [is found] in the Interscience
contract, construed in the context of a national labor policy." 376 U.S. at 550-51.
14. See, e.g., Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreemzents and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962) ; Christensen, Arbitration, Section 301, and the Nrational
Labor Relations Act, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 411 (1962) ; Jay, Arbitration and the Federal
Common Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 448 (1962) ; Well-
ington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471 (1962);
Comment, The Emergent Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: A Survey of the
Law Under Section 301, 28 U. Cmi. L. REv. 707 (1961).
15. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). This case and
those discussed in the text at notes 16-21 infra deal with issues of substantive arbitra-
bility - whether or not the dispute was covered by the arbitration clause of the collective
agreement. It has been persuasively argued that the task of providing standards for the
guidance of the federal judiciary in this area is best done by Congress, and that there-
fore the Supreme Court should not have made the attempt itself. See Bickel & Welling-
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section 301 cases were to be derived from "[our] national labor laws."'1 The
famed Steelworkers Trilogy, decided by the Court in 1960, added specific con-
tent to these standards. In two suits to compel arbitration' 1 and one to enforce
an arbitrator's award,1s the following propositions were established: since arbi-
tration is a matter of contract, a court, and not the arbitrator, should find the
obligation to arbitrate in the collective agreement, and must delimit the arbi-
trator's jurisdiction accordingly.'" Because of the nature of the collective
agreement, the special competence of the arbitrator in applying it, and the
belief that arbitration will lead to industrial peace - a significant tenet of our
national labor policy - the principal canon of judicial construction of labor
contracts adopted by the Court was a strong presumption in favor of arbitra-
bility: unless a dispute is specifically excluded from the grievance clause, a
court should consider it included.20 Since application of the presumption in
favor of arbitrability will often result in parties being compelled to arbitrate
disputes not clearly intended to be subject to arbitration, the contract ration-
ale - that arbitration is a matter of agreement between private parties -
will often be subordinated to this presumption.21 The degree of this subor-
dination is exemplified by the Wiley case itself, for the Supreme Court in the
initial segment of its opinion held that Wiley was obligated to arbitrate, al-
though the company was not a party to the contract containing the arbitration
clause.22
ton, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1957); see also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. at 460-68.
16. 353 U.S. 448, 456.
17. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
18. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). For
comment on the Steelworkers Trilogy see Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law
October Term, 1959, 60 CoLuU. L. REv. 901 (1960).
19. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
20. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
21. As an example, in the Warrior case the union successfully sought to persuade
a court to order arbitration on the question of whether the employer could contract out
work. Yet the evidence was clear that in bargaining sessions the union had persistently
attempted to get the employer to agree to make contracting out arbitrable, and had always
failed. In an ordinary contract case this history would probably have been sufficient to
induce a court not to order arbitration of the dispute, and in this case induced the district
and circuit courts to find for the employer. 168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958), 269 F.2d
633 (5th Cir. 1959). Yet as contracting out was not specifically excluded from the arbi-
tration clause in Warrior, the Court held it arbitrable.
22. At times it may be justifiable to hold a person liable on a contract he did not sign
despite the principle of freedom of contract. An example is given by a New York statute
which provides that a creditor will not lose a cause of action because his debtor has
entered a merger and the surviving party to the merger was not a party to the contract
creating the liability. N.Y. STOCK CORPORATioN LAw § 90; see also 15 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIoNS § 7121 (1961 rev. ed.). As the Wiley case arose in New York, the union
argued that it fit under this statute, and that a holding requiring Wiley to arbitrate would
1964]
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Before analyzing the issue of which decision-maker, court or arbitrator,
should adjudicate questions of procedural compliance, it should be useful to
describe the kind of problems to be resolved. Essentially two questions are
relevant: whether the union has complied with the procedural requirements
of the contract, and if not, whether its noncompliance was excusable. Com-
pliance cases, which form the great majority of procedural disputes, break
down into three general categories: questions of timeliness; questions of who
is eligible or required to file; questions where there has been no procedural
compliance at all, but instead a direct request for arbitration, such as Wiley.
TIMELINESS. 23 When Did the Violation Occur: In Twin Cities Container
Corp. and United Paper Patterns and Paper Workers, Local 1929,24 for ex-
ample, the collective agreement provided that all grievances must be filed with-
in ten calendar days of the grieved event. On December 11, 1962, the employer
not be antithetical to normal contract principles. The court did not consider the argument,
choosing instead to rely on. federal law as a source of its holding that Wiley was required
to arbitrate the questions raised by the merger. 376 U.S. at 548. But if the union fits
within the policy of the New York statute the Court's result would not seem to clash
seriously with contract law.
It seems clear, however, that the union was not the type of creditor envisioned by
the New York statute because it did not possess an existing cause of action against Inter-
science at the time of the merger. A labor contract does not guarantee employment for a
specific term with a cause of action arising for damages if it is terminated prior to the
period it is written to cover. Collective agreements provide only that as long as an em-
ployer operates the plant in substantially the same manner as when the contract was
written, he is required to abide by the standards of the agreement. Should he choose to
go out of business he is only liable to the union for the time worked by union members.
The collective agreement is a contract at will. When Interscience terminated its opera-
tions, the agreement also terminated, and the union had no cause of action for monies it
would have received had there been no merger. It is these monies the union. was trying to
get. As the union cannot be regarded as a creditor in the sense that the alleged debtor,
Interscience, is not liable to it for money the union would have received had the contract
been fully performed, it does not fit within the policy of the New York statute. The
Court's holding that Wiley was required to arbitrate under the Interscience contract is,
therefore, quite contrary to established contract principles.
It may be argued that when an employer has sold his business, but the plant is oper-
ated substantially as before, there is a legitimate interest in not requiring the union to go
through the entire process of renegotiating the collective agreement. The buyer ought to
assume the contract for the remainder of its term. This is clearly not the situation in
Wiley, however, in that the union, instead of having forty employees organized in a
small plant, had, after the merger, twenty-nine employees in a much larger working force
in a different plant. 376 U.S. at 545. To apply the Interscience contract to Wiley is to
ignore normal contract law, and the court recognized this. "While the principles of law
governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an unconsenting successor to a
contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract." Id. at
550.
23. This is by far the most common procedural breach. For additional comment on
the problems it produces see the STEELVORKR's HANDBOOK ox ARBITRATIoN DEcisioNs
120-28 (1960). For a discussion of grievance procedures, see generally TRorrA, LABOR
ARBITRATION 246-63 (1961).
24. CCH LABOR APB. AwARDs REP. 1 8615 (1963).
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closed the plant because of a snow storm so that the employees worked three
instead of the customary four hours. On the 12th of December the time cards
showed that the affected employees received credit only for the hours worked.
As the contract was susceptible to an interpretation that a four hour shift was
guaranteed, a possible grievance was created. On December 21, the employees
were paid for the period including the three hour day. The grievance was filed
December 31. If the violation had occurred when the affected employees were
notified that they would not be paid for a full shift, December 12, the griev-
ance was not filed on time; if the violation occurred when the employees were
actually paid, December 21, the filing was timely. The issue for decision was
at what time the violation occurred.
Notice: The collective agreement required the union to grieve within thirty
days of the alleged violation. Their complaint, the employer asserted, was
filed sixteen months late. In response, the union argued that they were only
required to file thirty days after they were notified of the violation, and absent
notification by the employer, they complied by complaining within thirty days
of their having reason to be aware of the violation. The issue involved .was
the meaning of "notification" under the contract.25
Continuing Violations: The employer contracted out work previously done
by members in the bargaining unit. Several months after the practice began,
the union filed a grievance, arguing that it was timely so long as the contract-
ing out continued, or for twenty days after the contracting out ceased. The
decision maker had to rule on whether the violation of the contract occurred
when the union first knew of the contracting out, or whether it continued as
long as the practice was maintained. If the latter, the grievance was timely. 6
IMPROPER FILING. The preamble to the grievance section of the collective
agreement provided that the section was intended to settle disputes between
the employer and the employees or the union. Then followed explicit directions
for how an employee should process a grievance; nothing was said of filing by
the union. A dispute arose which directly affected an employee but he neglected
to file a grievance. Since the dispute could have affected many other em-
ployees, the union attempted to file. The issue was whether the union could
file at all, and if so, whether it did so in a reasonable manner.27
COMPLETE FAILURE TO COMPLY. The collective agreement provided that a
party desiring arbitration must notify the other party in writing within twenty
days of the failure of the intra-company grievance procedure. More than nine
months after such a failure the union requested arbitration. In reply to the
assertion of a procedural breach, the union argued that the employer's con-
25. In re Republic Steel Corp., Gadsden Plant and United Steel Workers of America,
27 BNA LABOR AB. REP. 262 (1956) (Union filed sixteen. months after the disputed
practice arose).
26. In re ACF Industries, Albequerque Division and Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 38
BNA LABOR ARB. REP. 14 (1962).
27. National Lead Co. and United Steelworkers of America, Local 4585, CCH LABOR
ARB. AWARDS REP. ff 8422 (1963).
19641 1463
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
duct, a continual insistence that the substantive dispute was not arbitrable,
estopped him from relying on the breach. Whether such conduct should be
construed to estop the employer and excuse the union from performance was
at issue.28
Procedural arbitrability has been a troublesome issue for the lower federal
courts, and the decisions have been equally divided on the question of whether
a court or an arbitrator should adjudicate the issues involved in allegations
of noncompliance with grievance procedures.2 9 One reason for the split may
have been that some courts initially did not recognize procedural arbitrability
as an existing problem. Rather, courts simply decided whether or not the
union had complied with the grievance provisions, and if satisfied that the
union had done so, the court ordered arbitration of the substantive dispute.
No attention was paid to the issue of whether the court or arbitrator should
have been the decision-maker. When later the same courts discovered the is-
sue of procedural arbitrability, they ignored prior cases and resolved the issue
in favor of arbitration. A good example of this occurred in the Fifth Circuit.
28. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1961).
29. For the Arbitrator: Carey v. General Electric Co., 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. granted, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3003 (U.S. July 2, 1963) ; Local 748, IUE v. Jefferson City
Cabinet Co., 52 L.R.R.M. 2513 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Deaton Truck Line v. Local 612, Teams-
ters Union, 51 L.R.R.M. 2552 (5th Cir. 1962); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local
400, IUE, 286 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Radio Corp. of America v. Association of Pro-
fessional Eng'r Personnel, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Local 696, IBEW v. Ohio Power
Co., 53 L.R.R.M. 2026 (S.D. Ohio 1963); Furniture Workers v. Mohawk Corp., 52
L.R.R.M. 2209 (M.D. Pa 1963); Philadelphia Dress Joint Bd., ILGWU v. Sidele Fash-
ions, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Local 971, UAW v. Bendix-Wkestinghouse
Automotive Air Brake Co., 188 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ohio 1960) ; Association of West-
inghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 188 F. Supp. 225 (W.D. Pa.
1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1960) ; United Cement Workers v. Allentown-Portland
Cement Co., 163 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Wilson Bros. v. Textile Workers Union,
132 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), appeal di.missed, 224 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955) ; Insurance Agents Int'l Union v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122
F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
For the Court: Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Local 738, IBEW, 293 F.2d 929
(5th Cir. 1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238 (5th
Cir. 1961) ; Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st Cir.
1958), on remand, 171 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd, 268 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1959) ;
Grocery & Food Prods. Warehouse Employees Union v. Thomson & Taylor Spice Co.,
214 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Truck Drivers v. Grosshans & Petersen, Inc., 51
L.R.R.M. 2116 (D. Kan. 1962) ; Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
212 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962);
IBEW v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 51 L.R.R.M. 2133 (S.D. Ohio 1962) ; General Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Local 512, United Rubber Workers, 191 F. Supp. 911 (D.R.I.), aff'd
per curiam, 294 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1961); United Brick Workers v. Gladding, McBean
& Co., 192 F. Supp. 64 (S.D. Cal. 1961) ; Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery
Workers, 196 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd,
370 U.S. 254 (1962); Brass Workers v. American Brass Co., 172 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.
Wis.), aff'd, 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 845 (1960); Interna-
tional Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 164 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Ark.
1958).
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During 1961, the court, without recognizing a possibility of choice between
alternate decision-makers, twice held that a union was excused from comply-
ing with grievance procedures and ordered arbitration of the substantive dis-
pute.30 In 1962, without mentioning its prior rulings, the circuit court decided
that compliance should be determined by an arbitrator.3 1
Courts which have recognized the problem of procedural arbitrability and
have resolved the issue in favor of judicial decision usually rely on a contract
rationale.32 This contract argument is based upon the notion that the collec-
tive agreement, and only the collective agreement, confers jurisdiction on the
arbitrator, even when it contains a broad arbitration clause leaving all ques-
tions of contract interpretation or application to the arbitrator. The courts
have reasoned that this jurisdiction may not be exercised unless the two con-
ditions set by the parties have been met. First, the substantive dispute has
been made arbitrable by the contract; second, the condition precedent to arbi-
tration - compliance with the grievance procedures - has been fulfilled. 33
Accordingly, the court must rule on whether there was compliance with the
procedural requirements of the contract, or if not, whether the breach was
excusable. Of course, the parties may have agreed to let the arbitrator rule on
one or both of these conditions. But unless they have done so, and that agree-
ment can be fairly found in the contract, the courts must decide.
34
Prior to Wiley, however, most courts holding procedural questions arbitrable
have also claimed to rely on the collective agreement, specifically upon the
standard broad arbitration clause giving the arbitrator jurisdiction over every
dispute concerning the contract's interpretation or application.3 5 Courts then
reasoned that, as the issue of procedural compliance clearly involved the inter-
pretation or application of the agreement, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to
30. Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Local 738, IBEW, 293 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.
1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1961).
31. Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. Local 612, Teamsters Union, 51 L.R.R.M. 2552 (5th
Cir. 1962). A similar example of this phenomenon is given by the Second Circuit in hold-
ing, in the Wiley case, that procedural compliance is to be decided by the arbitrator. In
so holding it overruled Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 212 F.
Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); and Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery
Workers, 196 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), on the procedural question, and did not
mention either case.
32. See, e.g., Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st
Cir. 1958) ; Brass Workers v. American Brass Co., 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959).
33. This argument assumes that compliance with the grievance procedures is a con-
dition precedent to arbitration. The assumption seems a correct one. See text at notes
59-63 infra.
34. The best statement of this argument is found in judge Magruder's opinion, in
Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' Union, note 32 supra. For comment on the
opinion, see Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARv. L. Rxv. 1268
(1959); Note, Procedural Requirements of a Grievance Arbitration Clause: Another
Question of Arbitrability, 70 YA.LE L.J. 611 (1961).
35. See, e.g., Radio Corp. of America v. Association of Professional Eng'r Person-
nel, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1961) ; International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local 400, IUE, 286
F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1960).
14651964]
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decide it. In short, two contradictory lines of decision have stemmed from quite
similar contract language.
The cases which use the broad arbitration clause to make procedural com-
pliance arbitrable seem, however, to be in conflict with Supreme Court hold-
ings in the analogous area of substantive arbitrability.36 For example, a court
could reason from a broad arbitration clause that the question of whether
a particular dispute is covered by the clause also involves the interpretation
or application of the agreement and is thus for the arbitrator to decide. But
the Supreme Court has held that this question of substantive arbitrability
must be judicially determined despite the presence of broad arbitration
clauses.37 Procedural arbitrability, if viewed as a question of contract, is similar
to substantive arbitrability; both involve the issue of whether the parties in-
tended the particular dispute to be subject to arbitration. In the latter the
question is whether the dispute is of the character intended to be arbitrated,
while in the former the inquiry is which forum, court or arbitrator, was meant
to determine questions of procedural compliance. Both issues may thus be
analyzed as being concerned with the jurisdiction of the arbitrator established
by the parties in their contract. If reasons were offered to distinguish the juris-
dictional questions involved in procedural and substantive arbitrability, then
the procedural arbitrability cases utilizing the broad clause might be recon-
ciled with the Supreme Court cases on substantive arbitrability; however, no
court has attempted to do so. Thus reasoning from a broad arbitration clause
to make procedural compliance a question for an arbitrator would seem un-
warranted.
In addition, it might be argued that a holding that questions of procedural
compliance are arbitrable based on a broad arbitration clause is simply poor
contract construction. Arbitration clauses are usually written to deal with
grievances, which ".... are almost always complaints against action taken or
refused by the employer. ' 13 It is clear that the issues of procedural compliance
do not fall within this description of the type of dispute to be heard by an
arbitrator. A broad arbitration clause standing alone does not seem to be
sufficient evidence for a court to conclude that the parties intended procedural
questions to be arbitrable. It might be maintained, however, that the grant of
power to decide grievances necessarily comprehends the power to decide
whether the case is properly before the arbitrator; an arbitrator as an ad-
36. It should be noted that the terms substantive and procedural arbitrability are not
analogous since they pose different issues to the court. Substantive arbitrability involves
the issue of whether a given dispute was intended by the parties to be included in the
arbitration clause. Procedural arbitrability requires the court to determine which decision-
maker, court or arbitrator, should determine the issue of procedural compliance.
37. "Under our decisions, whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as
well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the
basis of the contract entered into by the parties." Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370
U.S. 238, 241 (1962).
38. Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. Ray. 999,
1007 (1955). See also ELxoux, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 64 (BNA 1956).
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judicator should have jurisdiction to decide his own jurisdiction. The argu-
ment logically extended leads to the proposition that the parties intended the
power to decide grievances to carry with it the power to decide all jurisdic-
tional questions pertaining thereto. Parties, however, presumably contract in
awareness of the law, and the law has always been that the jurisdictional
issue of substantive arbitrability is not a question for the arbitrator but rather
for the court.39 It seems anomalous to argue that the parties, recognizing this
rule of substantive arbitrability, meant by their silence to create a different
rule for procedural arbitrability. A more plausible reading of the contract
would be that the arbitration clause does not speak to jurisdiction at all.40
One possible reason for the courts' ready acceptance of the contract ration-
ale based on the existence of a broad arbitration clause is that initially it seems
a plausible way to construe the contract, and, as the procedural claim has often
been only one among a miscellany of contentions advanced by an employer to
avoid arbitration, many courts may not have considered the issue important
enough to warrant analysis in depth. A second explanation may be that courts
which have relied on the broad arbitration clause have used the contract ration-
ale to justify results reached on other grounds. judges, for example, may have
felt ill at ease deciding procedural compliance and may have preferred to leave
the decision to the expertise of an arbitrator. Courts, however, are seldom
reticent in the labor area to ascribe expertise to an arbitrator and remand
cases to him for decision ;41 yet in questions of procedural arbitrability only
one decision prior to Wiley suggested the rationale of expertise.4 It would
seem that in general the courts were either unaware of the expertise argument
or, for some reason, failed to articulate it.
In the Wiley case, the Supreme Court holding that procedural questions
were arbitrable was rested on a policy base, and the Court placed no reliance
39. While the term substantive arbitrability is a new one, it has long been the law
that courts must determine the scope of the parties' promise to arbitrate. See, e.g., United
States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950) ; Local 149, American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs
v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958);
Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd,
353 U.S. 547 (1957). U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 provides, inter alia, that a
federal court must be "satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is refer-
able to arbitration under ... an agreement . .. ."
40. Where the contract is not explicit on, the question of which decision maker was
intended by the parties, a court may, of course, find through extrinsic evidence, such as
established custom in the plant, that the parties nevertheless wished issues of procedural
compliance to be arbitrable. Also, a court could determine from extrinsic evidence that
the parties never considered the question of forums, and could then, by asking itself what
the parties would have intended had they thought of the issue, find that the litigants, by
indicating a preference for arbitration through the use of a broad arbitration, clause, would
have wanted questions of procedural compliance to be arbitrable as well. But where the
contract contains only the arbitration clause, and no extrinsic evidence is introduced, it
seems more probable that the parties wished a court to resolve their procedural problems.
41. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 17 and 18 supra.
42. Philadelphia Dress Joint Bd., ILGWU v. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 187 F. Supp.
97, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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on a contract analysis of the collective agreement.43 Thus, Mr. Justice Harlan
did not even rely upon the presumption in favor of arbitrability, employed by
the Court in its discussion of the substantive arbitrability aspect of the case,4-
to support his decision on the procedural issue.
The Court's conclusion that procedural compliance was an issue for the
arbitrator implicitly relied upon the presumed special competence of the arbi-
trator to make this type of decision. Although not clearly articulated in the
Supreme Court opinion,45 the argument based on the expertise of an arbitrator
may be broken down into two specific considerations. Initially, it is frequently
argued that the collective agreement is quite unlike other contracts.46 First,
the contract attempts to govern complex relationships for a significant period
of time. It therefore must be a somewhat general document which can be
completely understood only with some specialized knowledge of the general
background of industrial relations against which the parties contracted. Sec-
ond, collective agreements are often written in haste under pressure of a strike
and in moments of high tension. It is likely they will reflect the manner of
their creation, tending to be imprecise and not susceptible of easy construc-
tion. In fact, it is often the intention of the parties to be ambiguous; a conflict
at the bargaining table may be resolved through the drafting of a phrase ca-
pable of varying interpretations in the hope that a dispute will not arise or will
be more easily settled in the future. Lastly, there are certain areas where the
parties feel that specificity is unnecessary: Dean Shulman gives the example
of discipline for cause.4 7 All of these factors make the collective agreement a
very difficult document to construe. Only an arbitrator aware of the industrial
context and the character of the parties can successfully deal with the con-
tract, and courts ought not to try.
This argument is not necessarily true in matters of procedure. Grievance
provisions in collective agreements are basically the same, transcending in-
dustries and individual peculiarities. 48 Essentially these provisions provide for
43. The Court felt its holding "... best accords with the usual purposes of an arbi-
tration clause . . . ." 376 U.S. at 559. It did not ask, however, whether it accorded with
the purpose of the Interscience arbitration clause, a contention the Wiley attorney strenu-
ously denied. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 50-62. Inasmuch as the Court did not analyze
the collective agreement in the suit before it, but stated in the same sentence as the above
quotation that its result also accorded with ". . . the policy behind federal labor law . .
376 U.S. at 559, it seems clear the Court did not base its holding on the contract.
44. 376 U.S. at 550-51.
45. The opinion, as articulated, rested upon the Court's belief that as procedural ques-
tions were practically indistinguishable from substantive ones, the arbitrator should hear
them. Implicit in this reasoning is the conclusion that the same considerations of expertise
which the court believes apply in the substantive context, see, e.g., United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), apply equally to issues of procedure.
46. See, e.g., Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962) ; Shulman, supra note 38, at 1003-05.
47. Id. at 1006-07.
48. Ninety-four percent of collective agreements provide for arbitration. 2 BNA
COLLECTrvE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS § 51:7 (1960). More than nine
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"... a hierarchy of joint conferences between designated representatives of
the employer and the union."49 Their sameness is explicable in terms of the
purpose of these conferences. Simply, they serve to bring together at each level
union and company officials of roughly similar status, such as shop steward
and foreman, in order to encourage an orderly exchange of views on any
dispute with the intent of settling it at that level or of clarifying the issues
involved in order to ease the task of settlement for the more responsible per-
sonnel. If all else fails, the last step requires the selection of an arbitrator. The
function of this procedure is not limited to any one industry, nor is it so
complex as to require expert knowledge to understand and apply it.
Although the purpose of grievance procedures is simple and the procedures
are superficially similar in different agreements, it may be argued that, in fact,
these procedures are closely linked to specific circumstances and cannot be
fully understood out of context. Yet this does not compel the selection of an
arbitrator as the appropriate decision maker. For here, the collective agree-
ments are specific. They contain explicit directives as to who should file a
grievance, with whom, in what way, and by what time. They provide how
long decision should take at each level, who should appeal, to whom, how and
when, and how and when an arbitrator should be selected.50 When some certi-
tude is possible and desirable unions and employers normally seek it ;51 be-
cause of the unlikelihood of strikes taking place over whether a union should
file a grievance within ten or fourteen days, or whether the foreman or plant
manager should first hear it, the parties can and do write relatively explicit
agreements. Of course, local conditions will always be of significance in inter-
preting and applying the collective agreement, and a knowledge of them is
helpful. But here, with the purpose of the grievance procedures so clear, and
the contract itself relatively explicit, a court seems capable of coping with the
procedural aspects of a grievance clause.52 The very explicitness of the pro-
out of ten agreements outline steps to be followed in adjusting grievances, with the three
step procedure being the most common. Id. at § 51:4. Also, time limits for filing a griev-
ance are frequently imposed, 2 BNA CoLLECTIV BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CON-
TRACTS § 51:281 (1963), and there is usually a requirement that grievances be reduced
to writing. Id. at § 51:21. See generally ELKOURI, op. cit. supra note 37; see also note 23
supra.
49. Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. RFv. 999,
1007 (1955).
50. A good example of a typical grievance procedure set out in a collective agree-
ment is found in TROTTA, LABOR ARBITRATION 257 (1961).
51. Shulmarr, supra note 49, at 1005.
52. It may be argued that judicial application of the contract standard will result in
"standardization" not consonant with the inherently local nature of industrial govern-
ment. See Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1268,
1285 (1959). The short reply to this is that (a) the area of grievance procedures is in-
herently somewhat standardized; (b) if any local peculiarity of grievance procedure is
important to the parties, it can easily be written into the agreement; and (c) even if not
in the contract, such local custom can be urged upon the court as extrinsic evidence modi-
fying the written agreement.
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cedural clauses would, moreover, seem to preclude the utilization of a second
form of competence often attributed to arbitrators - the ability to act as a
constructive policy maker free to find a creative solution in those areas where
the result is not provided in the contract.5 3
A second facet of the expertise argument is suggested by the Supreme
Court in the Wiley opinion. Justice Harlan felt that finding a procedural
breach on the part of the union would not of itself end the matter; the decision-
maker must then decide whether the breach ought to cut off totally the union's
right to arbitration or should instead be reflected in the arbitration award. "
A decision-maker faced with a question of reinstatement could, for example,
find a procedural breach, decide to reach the merits despite it, and qualify or
structure the award to reflect the breach by granting less back pay than the
employee would have received had there been procedural compliance. The
Court felt that as the arbitrator alone could grant flexible remedies, a judge
would have to remand a case to the arbitrator whenever such structuring was
desirable. As structuring is likely to be desirable in most instances,r the great
majority of cases would be sent to arbitration despite procedural breaches.
Justice Harlan thus concluded that a court ought not to decide procedural
questions since it would be unable to provide a satisfactory remedy. In ad-
dition, the duplication of effort which would result if the court and arbitrator
both adjudicated questions concerning a breach was thought unnecessary and
undesirable. The argument rests on two premises: awards should be struc-
tured, and courts ought not to structure.
If the union's obligation to comply with the grievance provisions is deemed
promissory, the Court's first premise is clearly correct under traditional con-
tract analysis. The breach of a promise will give rise to an action in damages;
but unless a promise goes to the essence of the contract, its breach will not
relieve the other party from performance. 6 Should the promise to arbitrate
be independent from the promise to comply with the grievance procedure, a
breach of the latter will not necessarily defeat the right to arbitration, unless
the breach made arbitration useless or impossible.5 7 But if the obligation to
comply is considered as a condition precedent to arbitration, failure to comply
will absolutely defeat the union's right to arbitration in the absence of waiver
53. "The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of
the contract . .." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960), and the parties choose him because of "their trust in his personal judgment to
bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judg-
ment." Id. at 582. For a criticism of the Supreme Court's view of the arbitrator's function,
see Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law October Term, 1959, 60 CoLIU. L. REv.
901, 931-32 (1960).
54. 376 U.S. at 557-58.
55. Ibid.
56. Tichnor Bros. v. Evans, 92 Vt. 278, 102 Atl. 1031 (1918) ; Pinches v. Swedish
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 55 Conn. 183, 10 Atl. 264 (1887).
57. Cf. Lee v. Casualty Company of America, 90 Conn. 202, 96 At. 952 (1916);
Hammond v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 92 Kan. 851, 142 Pac. 936 (1914).
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or estoppel on the part of the employer. 5 The issue then is whether the
obligation to comply with the grievance procedures is promissory or con-
ditional, for if it is the latter no structuring of the remedy will be possible.
Whether an obligation is promissory or conditional depends on the intention
of the parties as expressed in the collective agreement and the circumstances
surrounding its formation and application.r At times, collective agreements
are quite specific. If the obligations spelled out in the grievance provisions
are followed by language stating that failure to follow them will be an absolute
bar to arbitration, it is very difficult to resist the conclusion that these ob-
ligations are conditional. This language was present in the Wiley agreement, 60
as in other collective agreements,6 1 but was given no effect by the Court. The
Court's ignoring of the absolute bar term seems unjustified since the phrase
itself may be superfluous in most collective agreements. It does not seem rea-
sonable to assume that the parties created an intricate and specific grievance
procedure, and at the same time intended that the union could easily avoid it
simply by requesting arbitration directly. If the obligation were promissory
this would be the case, and the employer's only remedy would be on the
promise, a remedy which is often hollow, since little or no damages flow from
the union's breach.62 On the other hand, it would seem consistent with the
probable intention of the parties - in the absence of specific language to the
contrary - to read grievance provisions as conditions precedent. Arbitrators
and courts, moreover, are virtually unanimous in holding that procedural
breaches totally defeat the right to arbitrate unless they are de minimis or
there is estoppel. 63 Since the premise that awards should be structured flies
58. 5 WiLLIsToN, CONTRACTS §§ 663, 675 (3d ed. 1961); 3A CoRBiz, CONTRACTS
§ 633 (1960) ; see also note 40 supra.
59. 5 WiluISTON, CONTRACTS § 663 (3d ed. 1961) ; see generally Corbin, Conditions
in the Law of Contract, 28 Y.LE LJ. 739 (1919).
60. See text at note 7 supra.
61. See, e.g., United Brick Workers v. Gladding, McBean & Co., 192 F. Supp. 64
(S.D. Cal. 1961), where the contract stated that a failure to comply with any provision
of the grievance procedure "shall render the grievance void." Id. at 65.
62. A reduction in the union's damages, traceable to its delay in filing the grievance,
might occasionally be appropriate. In such a case the arbitrator, if he decides to hear the
grievance in spite of its lateness (as for example where the employer's violation is deemed
"continuing"), will ordinarily limit damages to the contractual time period for filing the
grievance. For example, if the time limit for filing is twenty days, the union can get only
twenty days back pay. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., and Local 1207, Retail Clerks
Ass'n, 39 Lab. Arb. 567 (1962) ; Bethlehem Steel Company and United Steelworkers of
America, 23 Lab. Arb. 538, 540 (1954).
63. Brass Workers v. American Brass Co., 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 845 (1960); Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
212 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1963);
Bonney Motor Express, Inc. and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 40 Lab. Arb.
1019 (1963); H.K. Porter Company, Inc. and United Brick Workers, Local 600, 63-2
CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8791 (1963); Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc. and International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 63-2 CCH Lab. Arb. 1 8679 (1963) ; Truitt Mfg. Co. and International Ass'n
of Bridge Workers, Local 729, 27 Lab. Arb. 157 (1956). This unanimity may reflect more
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in the face of the parties' intent as expressed in the contract, courts can award
the only proper remedy in the procedural context - dismissal of the union's
complaint.
An additional justification used by the Court to support its holding that
procedural compliance was for the arbitrator was that, as procedural questions
were so closely linked with the merits of the substantive disputes, for a court
to decide issues of procedure would be to divide artificially and unnecessarily
a dispute which should be treated as a whole. 4 Accordingly, the Court re-
manded the procedural question to the arbitrator apparently in the belief that
his expertise rendered him better able to provide informed judgment on the
intertwined issues of procedure and substance.0 5 Yet the question of proce-
dural compliance seems distinct from and unrelated to the merits of the sub-
stantive dispute. Whether or not the union had notice of an alleged violation,
whether or not the employer's conduct excused the union from procedural
compliance, or how to measure the allowable filing period in cases of purported
continuing violations all seem to have no bearing on the underlying arbitrable
substantive questions. Indeed, even in the context of the somewhat unique
substantive arbitrability problems presented by the Wiley merger, issues of
procedural compliance are still clearly separable from the substantive merits.
The inquiry is simply as to the scope of the grievance provisions. This last
point may be expanded. Assume a collective agreement provides for a com-
plaint to the foreman as the first step in the grievance procedure. The em-
ployer decides to contract out a great deal of his work, and the union protests
directly to him. When this is unsuccessful the union seeks to arbitrate. In
response to an objection by the employer that the union failed to comply with
the grievance provisions, a decision-maker could find that the dispute involved
a matter of high company policy, that the foreman's decision could be of no
help to the union, and that procedural compliance in this instance was un-
necessary - the grievance provisions were simply not intended to cover this
type of dispute, although the dispute itself may be arbitrable. So too in Wiley
the Court could have found that the grievance provisions were not intended
to resolve merger problems, and therefore the union's non-compliance was
excusable. But in our hypothetical and in Wiley it is quite clear that a resolu-
tion of the procedural compliance question does not require a decision on the
substantive merits - whether the employer could contract out, or whether
merger terminated the collective agreement. It appears likely that in most
than respect for the principle of freedom of contract. Because of employer resistance and
the nature of an arbitration award it may be quite impractical to structure awards to
reflect procedural non-compliance.
64. 376 U.S. at 557-58.
65. If the dispute was susceptible of being treated as a whole, the Court could have
avoided the artificial division mentioned in the text by deciding the entire case itself. The
fact that the Court did not do so indicates a belief that considerations similar to those
which impelled it to remand the substantive dispute to arbitration apply to procedural
questions as well. One of these considerations is that of expertise. See note 45 supra.
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situations the procedural question is separable from the merits, and courts
need not get involved in the latter when they decide the former. It still might
be argued that even if procedural and substantive issues are severable, the
special competence of the arbitrator would make him the most appropriate
decision-maker in the procedural area. However, since the contract because of
its explicitness plays a predominant role in the procedural area, and since
courts seem capable of properly applying it, considerations of the arbitrator's
presumed competence lose much force.66
The Supreme Court in Wiley offered a third reason for sending procedural
questions to an arbitrator. It felt that requiring a judicial decision would un-
necessarily delay the arbitration process. 67 Allowing the parties to litigate pro-
cedural matters in court would provide them with the opportunity to "fraction-
ate"6 disputes in which the substantive issue was clearly arbitrable by litigat-
ing the procedural and substantive issues in separate forums. Such fraction-
ation, the Court felt, would only cause extensive delay and unnecessary costs.69
But disputes are equally "fractionated" when procedural compliance is undis-
puted and the issue is substantive arbitrability. Indeed, as the great majority
of cases involve issues of substantive arbitrability, the Court's argument should
apply with much greater force in the substantive area. Yet Justice Harlan
explicitly reaffirmed Wiley's right to demand a judicial determination of all
issues of substantive arbitrability.70
By deciding Wiley through reliance on a policy analysis, the Supreme Court,
in effect, created a rule of law that questions of procedural compliance are
always arbitrable. It might be argued, however, that the holding in Wiley
should not be read to create such a per se rule. The Court may not have en-
visaged a case where the contract clearly stated that procedural compliance is
to be judicially determined; faced with this explicit language the Court would,
of course, decide the procedural question itself. Wiley, therefore, might be
read as similar to the Steelworkers Trilogy which developed the presumption
in favor of arbitrability. But this view of the actual effect of Wiley overlooks
66. See text at note 53 supra.
67. 376 U.S. at 558.
68. Id. at 559.
69. Id. at 558-59.
70. In deciding Wiley the Court apparently was most concerned with evaluating the
relative merits of courts and arbitrators as adjudicators of procedural compliance. But in
its discussion the Court failed to recognize the policy consideration, that the efficacy of
arbitration is usually thought to depend upon the consent of the parties. See Shulman,
Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Hv. L. REv. 999, 1023-24 (1955) ;
see also ELKOUJR, How AmrrRATior WORKS 66-68 (1956). It is thus argued that an
arbitrator can perform most satisfactorily when he is conforming to the role designed for
him by the parties in the collective agreement. Ibid. Cf. Wellington, Freedom of Contract
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. R-v. 467, 491 (1964). There-
fore, when a court defines the arbitrator's role instead of allowing the definition to be
made by the parties, it is not likely that the arbitral process will work satisfactorily and,
hence, not likely that arbitration will achieve the goals the Supreme Court envisioned for
it.
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the fact that the absence of all presumptive language in Wiley makes the
opinion incline even more strongly toward arbitration than the Trilogy. The
Steelworkers' presumption may be rebutted by a showing of intent, but faced
with the Court's language in Wiley it would seem that a party not only must
demonstrate a clear intent to have a court decide procedural compliance, but
also must overcome the precedential weight of the Wiley holding, which is
not restricted to the particular facts but is phrased generally. Moreover, given
the strength of the Trilogy presumption as it is applied by the Supreme
Court,71 a holding which moves beyond the presumption would seem to have
an effect indistinguishable from a rule of law. Finally, a clear declaration that
procedural compliance is for the courts to determine is unlikely to be written
into most collective agreements. Bargaining for an explicit clause directing
courts to adjudicate a portion of the contract is likely to be a divisive issue in
negotiation given the typical union fear of judicial intervention in the labor
area.72 Since issues of procedural compliance are only remote contingencies
when bargaining occurs, a request for an explicit provision involving the fed-
eral courts will probably not be made.
Read as creating a rule of law, the Supreme Court decision in Wiley seems
to ignore the language of section 301. While section 301 is only a grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear suits brought under collective agree-
ments, it would seem that the section obligates the courts to decide all such
suits. 78 By announcing that procedural compliance is always for the arbitrator,
the Supreme Court has, in effect, stated that it will no longer adjudicate this
class of disputes arising within the ambit of the language of section 301. It
seems unusual, moreover, for a court with a clear grant of jurisdiction to
refuse to decide a class of disputes not because of traditional policies of judicial
restraint, such as mootness, justiciability, or ripeness, but because of a belief
that another decision maker would be more competent.74 This can be illus-
71. See note 21 supra.
72. This fear is exemplified by the traditional union opposition to use of the labor
injunction, see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 52 (1930) ; cf. Winter,
Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-
LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 71-76 (1960), an opposition which is strong today. Welling-
ton & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair
v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1565 (1963).
73. The relevant portion of the statute provides, "Suits for violation of contracts be-
tween an, employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in any district court .... "
§ 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). It seems implicit in the lan-
guage employed that any suit on a labor contract properly brought in a district court must
be decided by that court. Since it is ridiculous to argue that a suit may be brought but
not decided, a contrary interpretation. of the section than that reached in the text would
be that some suits for violation of contracts may not be brought in any district court. As
the section provides no guides for which suits may or may not be brought, and as it seems
phrased to allow all such union-employer actions, reading it to allow the courts to refuse
to hear some of them appears a strained interpretation of the language Congress used.
74. When courts refuse to decide cases on the ground that they involve political ques-
tions, they are, in effect, remanding the parties to the political process. But this kind of
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trated by imagining the reception a state court would receive if, in a traditional
contract action, it remanded the parties to commercial arbitration under penal-
ty of contempt of court and without reference to their agreement because an
arbitrator was thought more competent to render decision and because such
remand might produce other administrative efficiencies.
Although the Wiley decision thus seems to disregard the language of sec-
tion 301, support for the Court's holding can be sought in the basic policy
objective of the Labor Management Relations Act, that of achieving industrial
peace.", As it is often thought that arbitration produces industrial peace,76 it
might be argued that the Court properly construed section 301 in Wiley to
effectuate this goal 77 by forcing the parties to arbitrate questions of proce-
dural compliance. But it has been persuasively argued that the quest for in-
dustrial peace through arbitration is a futile one. Forcing the parties to arbi-
trate deeply felt grievances they did not agree to arbitrate will not prevent
conflict but only transfer it from the period during the contract to the time
when the contract expires.78
There is, moreover, a more fundamental objection to reading section 301
to favor arbitration because it prevents industrial strife. Such a reading seems
to be contrary to the scheme of the Labor Management Relations Act itself.
Congress was deeply concerned with industrial peace, to be sure, but in seek-
ing to achieve this goal it created an explicit regulatory scheme. One major
method by which Congress sought to achieve industrial peace was through
the creation of a system of unfair labor practices administered by the NLRB
which placed limitations on the use of economic force by employers and
unions. More relevant in the Wiley context is the second major congressional
strategy for achieving industrial peace, the duty to bargain in good faith em-
bodied in section 8(a) (5).7 9 In other contexts the Supreme Court has con-
strued section 8(a) (5) as limiting the role of the NLRB and the federal judi-
remand is unaccompanied by compulsion; the parties do not have to lobby in a legislature
or else face contempt of court. In Wiley, the parties must go to an arbitrator or go to
jail, and it is this fact that makes the Court's remand to another institution so unusual.
75. Congress found that "Industrial strife . . . interferes with the normal flow of
commerce [and] ... in order to promote the full flow of commerce.. ." 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
passed the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
76. Justice Douglas described arbitration as "the substitute for industrial strife," and
argued that it was "a major factor in achieving industrial peace." United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
77. The Court did not specifically mention industrial peace as a factor underlying
its holding on procedural arbitrability. But it was clearly a factor in the holding, dealing
with substantive arbitrability, 376 U.S. at 549, and seems to run through the entire opinion.
And in so far as the Court remanded issues of procedural compliance to the arbitrator
because it thought them indistinguishable from substantive questions, the industrial peace
basis of the substantive holding was probably meant to apply as well to the ruling on
procedure.
78. See Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
112 U. PA. L. Rnv. 467, 490-92 (1964).
79. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958).
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ciary to ascertaining whether the parties in fact bargained in good faith.80 The
Court has consistently maintained that Congress did not desire the NLRB or
the federal courts to write the substantive terms of the agreement for the
parties; section 8(a) (5), the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, institution-
alizes a congressional policy judgment that freedom of contract is desirable in
the industrial context.81 To the extent that Wiley fails to respect the intent of
the parties concerning adjudication of questions of procedural compliance, the
Court's interpretation of section 301 conflicts with the congressional policy of
freedom of contract expressed in section 8(a) (5). Nor does the legislative
history of section 301 afford any inference that Congress intended the section
to affect this principle of freedom of contract.8 2 In fact, when Congress wished
to limit the parties' right to contract freely in other contexts, it did so ex-
plicitly. As an example, Congress prohibited the parties from contracting on
the subject of "hot cargo" clauses.88 Finally, the policy of freedom of contract
seems particularly appropriate in the arbitration context.84 The grant of power
to the arbitrator reflects the relative bargaining power of the parties, their
trust in the arbitration process and their previous experience with it, the nature
of the employer's business, and the collective bargaining history in the plant.
It is unlikely that a court is more competent than the parties to strike a bal-
ance among these factors. The history of judicial involvement in labor relations
suggests that courts should not try to formulate labor policy in this manner.8 '
But this is the role the Supreme Court has assumed by deciding independently
of the contract which issues the arbitrator should hear.
ALAN SCHWARTZt
80. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Local 24,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins.
Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
81. ". . . Congress intended that the parties should have wide latitude in their nego-
tiations, unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate the substantive solution of
their differences." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960). For an
analysis of the Supreme Court's holdings on freedom of contract and the duty to bargain,
see Wellington, supra note 78; and Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 I-HAv.
L. Rev. 1401 (1958).
82. The legislative history of § 301 is collected in an appendix to Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's dissenting opinion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485
(1957). It clearly reveals that Congress considered none of the problems which have
arisen in this area since the Lincoln Mills case. See note 15 supra.
83. 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 158 § 8(e) (Supp. IV, 1964).
84. Wellington, sitpra note 78, at 494-98.
85. See generally FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCON (1930); Win-
ter, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemnporary Role of Norris-
LaGuardia, 70 YA E L.J. 70 (1960).
tLL.B. 1964, Yale University.
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